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I. INTRODUCTION

S CHOLARS live on through ideas.

And Larry Ribstein had ideas about
law schools, firms, and markets that will live on long after him. He spoke
to the work through "Ideoblog," a blog whose motto was: "A blog about
ideas. Ideas are not beliefs or opinions."1 It was a surprisingly esoteric motto
for a writer not afraid to dole out harsh criticism. But itcaptured something
special about Ribstein: his attraction to the power of ideas. He was not a
sentimentalist, nor a yellow-dog Republican or Democrat. He followed his

t

1

Professor, Hofstra University School of Law.
Professor, Saint Louis University School of Law. A version of this paper was presented at
the January 2013 annual meeting of the Association of American Law Schools (AALS).
The authors thank Lyman Johnson for his commentary on the paper at AALS. Part ii of
this Essay is based on our discussion of Larry Ribstein's book, "The Rise of the
Uncorporation," in Grant M. Hayden & Matthew T. Bodie, The Uncorporation and the
Unraveling of 'Nexus of Contracts" Theory, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1127 (2011).
This
header
appeared
at
Ribstein's
"ideoblog"
website.
ideoblog,
http://busmovie.typepad.com/ideoblog, which is no longer active. Ribstein later joined
the Truth on the Market blog, and his posts from both that blog and his earlier ideoblog
are
archived
at
that
site.
Truth
on
the
Market,
http://tmthonthemarket.com/author/larryer/.
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scholarly and ideological principles and advocated ceaselessly for their
implications.
One might expect a progressive paper on Larry's legacy to focus on the
importance of responding to his work in developing a compelling critique of
conservative law-and-economics scholarship. Something along the lines of:
"Ribstein's formidable development of the case for free-market libertarianism
provides a useful whetting stone upon which to hone a new programme for
economic equality." But that is not our approach. Instead, our claim-a
bolder one, but perhaps more tenuous-is that progressive corporate law
scholars can and should find ideas for legal reform in Ribstein's voluminous
writings. And this endeavor does not involve cherry-picking a passage here
or a footnote there. Many of Ribstein's most important ideas-his attack on
the "nexus of contract" theory for public corporations and his idealized
vision of small-c capitalism and the competition it engenders-provide
support for a world that is more egalitarian, less protective of elites, and more
robust in the economic opportunities that it offers. His attacks on certain
liberal tropes should lead not to an instinctual defense of those tropes, but
rather a reexamination of their underlying premises. In many situations,
progressive scholars may conclude that Larry was right-or, at least, had ideas
that would make the world a better place.
II. LARRY AS

CORPORATION CRITIC

Because Larry Ribstein was an avowed contractarian, one would have
expected him to agree with mainstream corporate law scholarship, which
remains centered on the "nexus of contracts" approach. And in fact, much
of Ribstein's writings accord with the view that corporate law should be
structured so as to allow the individual players to create economic
relationships on their own terms. He hated the increasingly regulatory
approach of corporate law, taking particularly aim at the two big federal acts
that had come along in the past decade. 2 However, while many scholars
thought that the federalization of corporate law was an unfortunate
encrustation on the existing state-oriented approach, Ribstein seems to have

2

HENRY N.

BUTLER &

LARRY E.

RIBSTEIN, THE SARBANES-OXLEY

DEBACLE: WHAT

WE'VE LEARNED; HOW TO Fix IT (2006); Larry E. Ribstein, Fiam"al Reform That Isn't,

FORBES.COM,
http://www.forbes.com/2010/07/08/financial-reform-biU-hedge-fundsopinions-columnists-larry-e-ribstein.html (July 15, 2010).
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begun to have doubts about the entire enterprise. In other words, he had
begun to doubt that the core premises of corporate law still longer held true.
The "nexus of contracts" theory holds that the firm - and by extension
the corporation-is merely a central hub for a series of contractual
relationships. 3 In other words, the firm is a "legal fiction;" it is "not an
individual' and has no real independent existence. 4 Instead of thinking of the
corporation as an independent entity, "nexus of contract" theory breaks it
down into its component parts.5 These parts are the contractual relationships
between the various parties involved with the firm: executives, directors,
creditors, suppliers, customers, and employees. Thus, corporate law is an
extension of contract law and should focus on facilitating the
interrelationships between contractual participants in the most efficient
6
manner.
The nexus of contracts theory has been extremely influential in shaping
corporate law theory of the past three decades.' But despite its dominance,
there is still confusion over whether the theory is a descriptive model, a
normative prescription, or some combination of both.8 Jensen and Meckling
presented a positive theory of the corporation and its concomitant
3

4
5

6

7

s

Michael C. Jensen & William Meckling, Theory of/he Firm: ManagerialBehavior,Agengy Costs
and CapitalStructure, 3J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).

Id. at 3 10-11.

See, e.g.,
William W. Bratton, Jr., The 'Nexus of Contracts" Corporation: A CiticalAppraisal, 74
CORNELL L. REV. 407 (1989) (defining the "nexus of contracts" approach as "the firm is a
legal fiction that serves as a nexus for a set of contracting relations among individual
factors of production").
Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM. L. REV.
1416, 1444 (1989).
Lewis A. Kornhauser, The Nexus of Contracts Approach to Corporations: A Comment on
Easterbrook andFischel,89 COLUM. L. REV. 1449, 1449 (1989) ("Critics and advocates agree
that a revolution, under the banner 'nexus of contracts,' has in the last decade swept the
legal theory of the corporation."); Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Board of Directors as Nexus of
Contracts, 88 IowA L. REV. 1, 9 (2002) ("The dominant model of the corporation in legal
scholarship is the so-called nexus of contracts theory."); Thomas S. Ulen, The Coasean Firm
in Law and Economics, 18 J. CORP . L. 301, 303 (1993) (arguing that "the nexus-of-contracts
view of the modern corporation and the principal-agent explanation of some important
aspects of the firm ...have had profound implications for some of the most important
issues of corporation law").
Melvin Eisenberg, The Conception That the Corporation is a Nexus of Contracts, and the Dual
Nature of the Firm, 24 J. CORP. L. 819, 824 (1999) ("Unfortunately, it has proved easy to
confuse the positive proposition that the corporation is a nexus of reciprocal
arrangements with the normative proposition that the persons who constitute a
corporation should be free to make whatever reciprocal arrangements they choose,
without the constraints of any mandatory legal rules.").
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relationships. 9 That thread has been picked up in the legal literature, with
Easterbrook and Fischel cementing the concept in place.10 But even at the
most basic of levels, the "corporation as contract" claim is simply incorrect.
Corporations are not creatures of contract. One cannot contract to form a
corporation.11 The individuals involved must apply to a state for permission
to create such an entity. The fact that this permission is readily granted (as
long as fees and taxes are paid) does not change the fact that permission is
required.12 Moreover, the designation is legally meaningful. As discussed
further below, putting a series of contractual relationships within a
corporation changes those contractual relationships.
The fallback position of contractarian scholars is that the nexus of
contracts model is not a literal claim.13 But it's often difficult to determine
when the theory crosses the line from abstracting metaphor to description of
reality. 14 To say that we should conceive of the firm as a nexus of contracts
9

10

11

12

13

14

Jensen & Meckling, supra note 3, at 310-11.
Michael Klausner, The Contractarian Theo of CorporaleLaw: A Generation Later, 31 J. CORP.
L. 779, 780 (2006) (describing Easterbrook and Fischel as "the primary expositors of the
contractarian theory").
This fact is acknowledged by contractarian theorists. See Easterbrook & Fischel, Corporate
Contract, supra note 6, at 1444-45 (acknowledging that statutory corporate law is necessary
to create a corporation).
Cf. Bratton, supra note 5, at 445 ("If the corporation really 'is' contract, as the new
economic theory tells us, then the last doctrinal vestiges of state interference should have
withered away by now .... But the sovereign presence persists.").
Fred McChesney, for example, stated: "Admittedly, as a descriptive matter state
corporation codes and other sources of law contain many mandatory terms that parties
cannot contract around ....
[T]o claim that contractarians would deny the existence of
coercive legal rules is to accuse them of blindness or stupidity." Fred S. McChesney,
Economics, Law, and Science in the CorporaleField: A Comment on Eisenberg, 89 COLUM. L. REV.
1530, 1537 (1989). But it is sometimes difficult to parse the language of the theory to
determine what is actually being claimed. See Bainbridge, "Nexus," supra note 7, at 11 ("I
have come around to the view that the corporation is a nexus of contracts in a literal
sense, albeit a very limited one."); Julian Velasco, Shareholder Ownership and Primacy, 2010 U.
ILL. L. REV. 897, 919 ("[A]lthough it may be technically accurate to describe a corporation
as a nexus of contracts, it is entirely inadequate.").
It is difficult to measure the extent to which contractarians shift their metaphor into the
realm of literal truth. Certainly, most contractarians will admit that a corporation cannot
be formed through contract. However, the theory is often described in shorthand as a
positive description. See, e.g., JONATHAN R. MACEY, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: PROMISES
MADE, PROMISES KEPT 22 (2008) ("It has long been recognized ... that the corporation.
• . should be viewed as a 'nexus of contracts' or a set of implicit and explicit contracts.");
Stephen M. Bainbridge, Unocal at 20: Director Prmal in Corporale Takeovers, 31 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 769, 781 (2006) ("it is commonplace and correct to say that the corporation is
a nexus of contracts . . .
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for certain purposes is different than saying that corporations actually are
simply a nexus of contracts.15 Yet both characterizations are used seemingly
interchangeably.16 Moreover, contractarians often seek to minimize the role
of the state to such a degree that it becomes vestigial. Easterbrook and
Fischel, for example, claim that when it comes to the corporation, "what is
open to free choice is far more important to the daily operation of the firm,
and investors' welfare, than is what the law prescribes."1 Corporate law thus
becomes a way of facilitating the other aspects of the corporation - the more
important, contractually-based ones.1"

Thus, contractarians have two competing sets of positive claims, with two
sets of normative takeaways. 19 First, they argue that the corporation is
primarily contractual, and as such it represents terms that the parties have
freely chosen amongst themselves. Since the terms have been freely chosen,
we can presume they are efficient. 20 This claim leads to the normative
15

16

17

is

19

20

For a discussion of the uses and misuses of models in corporate law theory, see G. Mitu
Gulati, William A. Klein & Eric M. Zolt, Connected Contracts, 47 UCLA L. REv. 887, 88993, 945-48 (2000). See also Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Introduction to the Metaphors of Corporale
Law, 4 SEATTLE J. FOR Soc. JUST. 273 (2005) (discussing the use of metaphors in
corporate law).
Bill Bratton has described how Easterbrook and Fischel moved over time from a strong
version of the theory to a weaker one. See William W. Bratton, The Economic Structlure of the
Post-ContractualCorporation, 87 Nw. U. L. REv. 180, 184 (1992) ("Easterbrook and Fischel
are so astute that they keep a safe distance from the assertion that the corporation is a
nexus of contracts. The book delimits and subordinates this once foundational
proposition.").
Easterbrook & Fischel, Corporate Contract, supra note 6, at 1418. They continue: "For debt
investors and employees, everything (literally) is open to contract; for equity investors,
almost everything is open to choice." Easterbrook and Fischel assumedly are only
speaking of state corporate law here, as there are significant regulations placed on debt
and employment contracts.
As Easterbrook & Fischel state: "Why not just abolish corporate law and let people
negotiate whatever contracts they please? The short but not entirely satisfactory answer is
that corporate law is a set of terms available off-the-rack so that participants in corporate
ventures can save the cost of contracting. There are lots of terms, such as rules for
voting, establishing quorums and so on, that almost everyone will want to adopt.
Corporate codes and existing judicial decisions supply these terms "for free" to every
corporation, enabling the venturers to concentrate on matters specific to their
undertaking." Id. at 1444.
Klausner, supra note 10, at 783 ("Easterbrook and Fischel's theory of corporate law is
both normative and positive: that corporate law should take this form; and that it 'almost
always' does.").
A more nuanced version of this would be: having the parties choose their terms is the
system most likely to lead to an efficient result over time, as there is no other system likely
to result in greater efficiency.
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perspective that since the corporation is merely an intersection of voluntary
agreements, corporate law should eschew mandatory rules. 21 The second set
of claims, however, suggests that corporate law does provide default or even
mandatory terms in those situations where these terms are approximations of
the will of the parties.22 These mandatory terms trump contractual freedoms,
but they are designed so that the parties may more efficiently go about the
rest of their business. The concern for these mandatory terms is mitigated,
because there is choice amongst the fifty states as to the laws of
incorporation.

2

Larry Ribstein was a contractarian. Prior to his book The Rise of the
Uncorporation, his work largely demonstrated agreement with the descriptive
and the normative aspects of the nexus of contracts theory. His most direct
discussion of the theory is "Opting Out of Fiduciary Duties: A Response to
the Anti-Contractarians," an article he wrote with Henry Butler. 24 Butler and
Ribstein define contractarian theory as: "the corporation is a set of contracts
among the participants in the business, including shareholders, managers,
creditors, employees and others." 25 They argue that private ordering is the
best way to arrange these relationships. 26 Like Easterbrook and Fischel,
2
however, they view state corporation law as an extension of the contract. 1
21

22

23

Stephen M. Bainbridge, Comm .iy and Statism: A Conservative Contractaarn Crtique of
Progressive Corporate Law Scholarship, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 856, 860 (1997) ("The nexus of
contracts model has important implications for a range of corporate law topics, the most
obvious of which is the debate over the proper role of mandatory legal rules."); Lucian
Arye Bebchuk, Foreword: The Debate on ContractualFreedom in CorporaleLaw, 89 COLUM. L.
REV. 1395, 1397 (1989) (noting that corporate law contractarians argue "that the
contractual view of the corporation implies that the parties should be totally free to shape
their contractual arrangements").
MACEY, supra note 14, at 22 ("[B]usiness law, including corporate law, exists to economize
on transaction costs by supplying sensible 'off-the-rack' rules that participants in a
business can use to economize on the costs of contracting.").
See, e.g.,
ERIN E. O'HARA & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE LAW MARKET (2009); ROBERTA
ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAw (1993).

24

25
26

27

Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, Opting Out of Fiduciary Duties:A Response to the AntiContractarians,65 WASH. L. REV. 1 (1990).
Id.at 7.
Their focus, like Jensen and Meckling, is on agency costs: "The corporate contract also
specifies the extent to which the parties rely on the competitive pressures from capital,
product, and managerial labor markets as well as internal incentive structures such as
corporate hierarchy, boards of directors and managerial compensation contracts, to force
agents to act in their shareholders' best interests." Id.
Id. ("The terms of the agency contract include the provisions of state law, which are
regarded as a standard form that can be accepted by the parties or rejected either by
drafting around the provision or by incorporating in another state.").
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And they are quick to move to the "policy implication" that "private parties
to the corporate contract should be free to order their affairs in whatever
28
manner they find appropriate."
"Opting Out" criticizes anticontractarians on both descriptive and
normative grounds. The authors point to the "demise" of concession theory,
based on the notion that "[t]hroughout the nineteenth century, under the
onslaught of increasingly permissive general incorporation statutes, state
creation gradually yielded to private formation of the corporation and private
ordering of the corporate relationship." 29 They concede that "modern
corporate statutes do include many mandatory terms, including voting rules,
fiduciary duties and legal capital rules." 30 However, they argue that these
mandatory terms are, in most cases, better characterized as some form of
avoidable placeholder. Some seemingly mandatory rules may be strong
default rules that can nevertheless be contracted around.31 Other mandatory
rules, such as shareholder voting on mergers, can be avoided by restructuring
the underlying transaction.3 2 Moreover, parties can avoid the mandatory rules
from a particular state by incorporating in another state or choosing another
organizational form.33 They conclude:
In sum, truly "mandatory"' provisions are the exception rather than
the rule in the law of business associations. The most important
mandatory provisions are the federal securities laws and state
provisions that are imposed on existing investors in firms. While
these provisions are not trivial, they do not establish the non34
contractual nature of the corporation.
Interestingly, Butler and Ribstein also criticize Easterbrook and Fischel
for not being sufficiently committed to the contractual model. They argue
that Easterbrook and Fischel use the concept of a "hypothetical bargain" to
impose certain terms upon the corporate contract.3 5 Calling this approach
"inconsistent with the contract theory of the corporation," Butler and
28

Id.at 7-8.

29
30
31

Id.at 9.
Id.at 10.
Id.(discussing the close-corporation buyout rules from Donohue v. Rodd Electrotype Co.
of New England, Inc., 328 N.E.2d 505 (Mass. 1975)).

32
33
34
35

Id.
Id.at 11.
Id.at 11-12.
Id.at 16-17.
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Ribstein contend that "it is one thing to propound a default rule to cover
situations not covered in the parties' contract, and another thing to state a
general rule applicable irrespective of contract."36 A true contractualist, in
their view, would favor a default approach, one that allowed parties to
3
contract in accord with their preferences. 7
The debate between two sets of committed contractarians over the
proper approach to the corporate rules is indicative of the nexus of contract
theory's unsettled state - drifting between reality and metaphor, description
and normative judgment.31 In The Rise of the Uncoporation, however, Ribstein
makes clear that the descriptive claim is no longer true. The book tracks the
developments of two broad types of business organization: the corporation
(in both public and private forms) and the "uncorporation," a collective term
for a variety of partnership-like organizations, primarily partnerships and
limited liability companies (LEGs). 39 Ribstein tracks the history of these
forms as two inversely-related lines: uncorporations predominated up until
the latter nineteenth century, at which point the corporation took off and
achieved a century of dominance. Although the corporation remains the
primary form of business organization, the uncorporation is catching up,
constituting almost a third of all tax-reporting business entities. 40 As the title
of the book suggests, the corporation is poised to plummet as the
uncorporation begins its ascent.
The Rise of the Uncorporation is a refutation of the descriptive part of the
nexus of contracts theory, at least as applied to the twenty-first century
corporation. To be sure, Ribstein is committed to nexus of contract theory in
its normative instantiation; he believes that individual participants in a
business organization should be left free to construct that organization as they
see fit. But the new organizational hero for contractarians, in Ribstein's
telling, is the uncorporation. The uncorporation, unlike pretenders before it,
is actually something close to the pure nexus of contracts. To make his case,
Ribstein uses a foil, and that foil is the corporation.

17.

36

Id. at

37

Id. They discuss the example of management responses to hostile corporate takeovers.
Easterbrook and Fischel support rules requiring management passivity, while Butler and
Ribstein would impose default rules.
Cf Eisenberg, supra note 8, at 836 (finding that nexus of contract theory "can be
understood in either a very weak or a very strong sense").
LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE RISE OF THE UNCORPORATION 1 (2010).
Id.at 3.

38
39
40
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On a fundamental level, corporations all share the same governance
characteristics. The firm is controlled by a board of directors, who in turn
select the officers who run the day-to-day business of the operation. This
board is elected by shareholders. The shareholders share in the profits of the
corporation through dividends and can sell their shares on the open market.
This same basic structure - shareholders elect directors who appoint
41
officers-can be found in every public corporation.
Why is this tripartite power dynamic so uniform across corporations? Is
it because corporate law requires this structure, or because this structure is the
most efficient and therefore freely chosen? Contractarians would point to the
default nature of corporate law statutes as evidence that this structure is
optimal. For example, section 141 of Delaware General Corporation Law
states: "The business and affairs of every corporation organized under this
chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of directors,
except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter or in its certificate of
incorporation." 42 Thus the board-the central feature of corporate
governance-appears to be merely a default rule. Similarly, the Model
Business Corporation Act states that "[a]ll corporate powers shall be
exercised by or under the authority of, and the business and affairs of the
corporation managed by or under the direction of, its board of directors,
subject to any limitation set forth in the articles of incorporation."' 43 Perhaps
44
corporations could really be arranged in almost any possible fashion.
However, this apparent flexibility is belied by the actual structure of most
corporations and the presence of other mandatory requirements. In practice,
for example, corporate charters are extremely homogenous. 45 The diversity
that one might expect from a collection of firms with heterogeneous
governance needs is nowhere apparent. 46 Moreover, the apparent flexibility
of corporate law on paper is undercut by a more complex reality. The textual
openness of § 141(a), for example, masks a fairly rigorous defense of
41
42

The same is true of closely-held corporations, although the roles overlap to a great extent.
Del. Code tit. 8 § 141(a) (2010).

43

MB CA § 8.01 (b).

44

Lynn A. Stout, The Shareholder as Ulysses: Some Empirical Evidence on Whj Investors in Public
Relations Tolerate Board Governance, 152 U. PA. L. REv. 667, 669 (2003) ("Delaware law
accordingly treats board governance as a default rule that can be 'bargained around' in the
corporate charter."). See generaly Henry Hansmann, Corporation and Contract, 8 AM. L. &
ECON. REv. 1, 2 (2006) ("Even more than is commonly realized, virtually all of corporate
law today consists of default rules rather than mandatory rules.").
Klausner, supra note 10, at 784, 786-91.
Id. at 784.

45
46
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managerial power. Shareholders' power to amend the corporation's bylaws
under § 109(b) of the Code takes a back seat to the more free-ranging power
of § 141(a). 47 In addition, many aspects of federal securities law, particularly
SEC Rule 14a-848 and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 49 assume the existence of the
certain governance mechanisms, such as the board and shareholder meetings,
before adding additional requirements.s °
Ribstein argues that centralized management is "[t]he feature that best
characterizes the large-firm nature of the corporation," and the board of
directors is "one of the most distinctive features of the corporate form.'""
He contends that "only a corporation must have a board of directors that is
separate from the executives and appointed directly by the owners." 52
Shareholder voting is part of the "legally mandated corporate governance
structure;" it is so critical that it is considered "sacred space."5 3 In addition,
Ribstein points to transferable shares, fiduciary duties, and capital lock-in as
other essential "governance" elements of the corporation. 4 Each of these is
55
essentially required as part of the corporate form.
Ribstein does not spend a great deal of time defending his
characterization of these corporate characteristics as mandatory. This is a
critical point, as some contractarians have depicted the modern corporation
as the product of market forces rather than state law. 56 It is somewhat
surprising to see this article of contractarian faith being dismissed so cavalierly
47

48
49
50

51
52
53
54

56

John C. Coates IV & Bradley C. Faris, Second-Generaion Shareholder Bjlaws: Post-Quicklurn
Alternatives, 56 Bus. LAw. 1323, 1353 (2001) ("A bylaw is impermissible if its primary
purpose is to prevent or interfere with the board's discretion under section 141(a) to
manage the business and affairs of the corporation .... "); Lawrence A. Hamermesh,
Corporate Democrat7 and Slockholder-Adopled Bj-Laws: Taking Back the Slree?, 73 TUL. L. REV.
409,428-44 (1998).
17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(1) (2009).
Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29
U.S.C.).
For example, Rule 14a-8 gives shareholders the authority to propose actions to the board
at the annual meeting, and Sarbanes-Oxley puts independence requirements on audit
committees, which are subcommittees of the board. Sarbanes-Oxley Act 5 301, 15 U.S.C.
§78j-1 (Supp. iii 2003).
RIBSTEIN, supra note 39, at 67.
Id.
Id. at 69.
Id. at 68-75.
I5
In an earlier piece, Ribstein (with Butler) argued that fiduciary duties were not outside of
the realm of contract law and thus should not be counted as evidence of a
noncontractarian approach. Butler & Ribstein, supranote 2, at 28-32.
See, e.g., Hansmann, supra note 44, at 1-2.
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by a contractarian.
But the mandatory nature of these governance
"requirements" is necessary for Ribstein to tell his political economy story.
Each of these factors, to a greater or lesser degree, plays a critical role in the
government's regulation of and control over the modern corporation.
As Ribstein describes it, "[t]he corporate form represents a quid pro quo:
big firms get corporate features, and government gets an opportunity to
regulate governance."5 Thus, the board of directors is not just an efficient
way of centralizing authority, as others have argued. 58 It also plays a
"politically legitimizing role" and has the opportunity to "help constrain
corporations to act consistently with the objectives of lawmakers rather than
solely those of investors."59 The shareholder meeting is "not simply a way to
ensure that managers are running the firm in the shareholders' interests, but
also a mechanism for admitting vox populi into the running of these powerful
institutions."60 Given the power of large corporations for good and evil,
Ribstein argues, lawmakers sought to introduce internal limitations on this
corporate power.61 Of course, tax was an issue as well. The corporate taxcharacterized as "double taxation," since dividends are taxed as well-was "in
a sense a fee for incorporating." 6 2 All of these restrictions on corporate
freedom can be traced back to regulatory motives.
Given the corporate tax, as well as the regulation of corporate
governance, why did the great majority of businesses choose the corporation
as their organizational form? Ribstein's answer is, largely, the promise of
limited liability. The role of limited liability has long been a b&te noire for
contractarians, since it is clearly an aspect of the corporation that is not
contractual. Its importance has been minimized, overlooked, or disputed. In
Rise, however, Ribstein decisively argues that the corporation's monopoly on
limited liability was the key to its organizational popularity.
Limited liability is the reason why the corporation succeeded where the
partnership failed.
Discussing the characteristics that are specific to
corporations, Ribstein notes that "partnerships long have been able to
contract for such corporate-type features, with one critical exception - limited
liability."63 As he makes clear, limited liability is distinctly non-contractarian:
57
58
59
60
61
62

63

RIBSTEIN, supra note 39, at 66.

Bainbridge, supra note 7.
RIBSTEIN, supra note 39, at 68.
Id.at 70.
Id. at 86-87.
Id. at 99.
Id.at 76.

132
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"Limited liability is particularly important because, unlike other corporate
features discussed above, partnerships could not easily contract for it without
lawmakers' cooperation as they have to include the creditors in these
contracts." 64
Although he recognizes that there may have been
(cumbersome) contractual methods for limiting liability for contractual
claimants, it would have been "impossible" to secure limited liability against
tort claimants without the government's help.65 And limited liability is not
window dressing. As Ribstein concedes: "This feature is basic because . . . it
is the one that parties cannot replicate by private contract. Whether a
statutory form provides for limited liability therefore will dominate parties'
choice of form."66
Control over liability is what gave lawmakers the upper hand in directing
organizational choice. It was the carrot that states used to get businesses into
the corporate form. The tradeoff between limited liability, on the one hand,
and the tax and regulatory treatment of the corporation, on the other, is
critical to Ribstein's political economy narrative: "As lawmakers could control
access to limited liability, they could extract a quid pro quo for it by
channeling limited liability firms into the corporate form and then taxing and
regulating corporations." 61
The delay in the development of the
uncorporation stems from legislators' desire to maintain the limited
availability of this quid pro quo. Ribstein contends: "Government has
jealously guarded the prerogative of cresting limited liability and sought to
68
channel limited liability into the regulated corporate form."
The importance of limited liability is a theme Ribstein turns to over and
over again in the book.69 For example, the closely-held corporation makes no
sense to Ribstein as an organizational form, as it imposes a structure on small
firms that is much more suitable to larger companies. 0 In Ribstein's view,
79.

64

Id.at

65

Id.

66

69

Id. at 138 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 79. Ribstein believes that the normative basis for the quid pro quo is unclear.
"Limited liability could not be considered a subsidy to firms to the extent that creditors
adjust their credit charges for the greater risk. Even to the extent that limited liability
shifts risks to tort creditors who cannot demand compensation for the additional risk,
society arguably gains because investors are attracted to socially productive ventures.
However, it is not clear why limited liability firms should "pay" for this social benefit by
being subjected to extra constraints on their operations." Id. at 79-80.
Id. at 139.
See id.at 5, 8, 10-11, 25, 37, 43-44, 72, 79-85, 95-97, 99-101,120-21,127, 138-47, 153,
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162, 164-65, 256.
Id. at 95-96.
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"[c]losely held firms' widespread use of the corporate form indicates that the
benefits of limited liability outweighed firms' costs of having to accept the
other aspects of the corporate form along with it.""I This basic equation
started to shift, however, as tax reform in the 1980s made the corporate tax
more onerous. Businesses started to push for organizational forms that
avoided the corporate tax without many of the drawbacks of partnership. For
a time, the Kintner regulations 2 drew the line as to which firms would be
taxed as corporations. Because firms with limited liability were considered
corporations, "the tax classification rules effectively forced firms to pay a tax

to the federal government for complete limited liability.""7 However, as
businesses grew increasingly dissatisfied with the strictures of the corporate
form, pressure grew for an alternative. The limited liability company,
originally a modest vehicle for oil and gas companies, threaded the needle by
getting classified as a partnership for tax purposes,1 4 despite having limited
liability." This leak in the dam ultimately drove the IRS to adopt a "check the
box" rule allowing firms to choose whether they wanted to be taxed as
partnerships or corporations."6 "Check the box" opened the door for the full
flowering of the "uncorporation," as limited liability was allowed to coexist
with favorable tax treatment.
Ribstein tells a story of contractual desires ultimately breaking free of a
regulatory scheme that sought to channel businesses into one particular form.
Certainly one could tell a different story: the story of how the corporation
carefully balanced costs and benefits amongst businesses and society until
interest groups finally succeeded in cracking the tax code. This is not
Ribstein's narrative, but it is consistent with his version of events. More
importantly, both stories emphasize the importance of the government and of
organizational law to the choice of organizational form. The corporation is
not simply a nexus of contracts. It is an organizational form with a set of
state-given benefits (primarily limited liability) along with a set of taxes and
95.
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Id. at
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Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a) (1996).
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The regulations were promulgated in the wake of

Kintner v. United States, 216 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1954).
RIBSTEIN, supra note 39, at 100. The S corporation was an exception. See 26 U.S.C. 5
1361-1379. Ribstein characterizes the S corporation as a "kind of political safety valve by
which Congress hoped to head off both demands to eliminate the corporate tax and state
efforts to provide for the partnership with limited liability.
RIBSTEIN, supra note 39, at
113.
IRS REv. RUL. 88-76, 1988-2 C.B. 360.
RIBSTEIN, supra note 39, at 120-21.
Id. at 121. See TREAS. REG. § 301.7701-1-3 (2004).
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mandatory governance rules. The state plays a much larger role in the story
than contractarians have ever before allowed.
Ribstein's uncorporation seems to be the undoing for the nexus of
contracts theory, at least as a positive description. The corporation is not
simply a point at which myriad contracts intersect.
It is instead a
governmentally-created organizational body that imposes specific constraints
on participants. Conceiving of the corporation as a simple agglomeration of
private agreements-even metaphorically-is deeply misleading. As the
uncorporation demonstrates, the corporation has many specific features that
could be considered either mandatory or quasi-mandatory. These features
distinguish the corporation not only from the realm of contract but from the
uncorporation as well.
A contractarian might, at this point, turn the diversity in organizational
choice around and argue that the variety demonstrates a different kind of
contractual freedom. After all, as Ribstein argues, having a multitude of
organizational choices allows parties to pick and choose the organizational
form that best suits their needs.
Businesses are no longer stuck with the
corporation; they are now free to choose any of the variety of uncorporations
instead. Because parties are still using the corporation, even in the midst of
organizational plenitude, that must mean that parties prefer the corporation.
It is the choice of the majority of businesses; it must therefore have
advantages that other organizational forms do not. In other words, we can
say that the corporation is like a nexus of contracts, in that it is freely chosen
by the parties as the best organizational delivery system for their relationships.
Even if not literally a contractual nodule, it represents the parties' free
choice."
This is not the argument Ribstein makes in Rse. He argues instead that
the uncorporation is a superior vehicle for addressing the problems of
contemporary organizational structure."9 Arguing that the corporation is "far
from ideal" as a governance structure, Ribstein claims that "the
uncorporation provides potentially more efficient ways to control the agency

supra note 39, at 178.

77

RIBSTEIN,
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See Butler & Ribstein, supra note BR1, at 11 ("[T]he parties to a firm can opt out of terms
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that are mandatory for all corporations simply by choosing among different investment
and organizational forms. For example, the 'mandatory' requirement of at least majority
shareholder voting on significant corporate transactions can be avoided by
disincorporating into a limited partnership.").
RIBSTEIN, supra note 39, at 193.
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costs of centralized management."80 He argues that the traditional corporate
tools for restraining managers-shareholder voting, boards of directors,
fiduciary duties, and takeovers-have failed to provide the proper market
discipline.81 Instead, the uncorporation's combination of greater managerial
freedom and stronger mandate for distributions provide a better approach, in
82
his view, for reducing managerial costs.
If the uncorporation is a superior organizational form, why is it only
gaining popularity now? Ribstein provides only a brief direct answer, citing
the increased salience of agency costs, greater financial complexity, and
advances in organizational development.83 His narrative, however, describes
how the uncorporation has only recently been freed of its regulatory shackles,
with "check the box" allowing uncorporations both favorable tax treatment
and limited liability. It is state lawmakers and federal bureaucrats who created
the LLC revolution. Political forces entrenched the corporation; now those
forces have created an opening for the uncorporation.8 4 To the extent the
uncorporation does face challenges to its growing role, Ribstein sees those
challenges largely coming from the government.85 This is not a story of firms
adapting to organizational demands through contract. It is a story of
government facilitating growth (or not) through the organizational forms it
provides:
The large uncorporation's story is still unfolding. Courts, regulators,
and tax authorities may decide that large firms should be subject to
corporate rules whatever business form they have chosen. On the
other hand, policy makers may see that the crisis in the governance of
large firms demands a fresh approach rather than just tinkering with
an increasingly unsatisfactory model. Understanding the distinct
mechanisms of uncorporations and giving them room to operate may
be a key to this fresh approach.86
so

Id.
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Id. at
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Id. at 207-13, 214-17.
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governance rights are generally difficult to transfer. Id. at 218. Although the market for
corporate control has long been a critical aspect of imposing economic discipline on
corporations, Ribstein believes this market is not necessary for uncorporations. Id. at
218-19.
Id. at 194.
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In other words, it is up to government to develop the organizational forms
necessary for efficient private ordering.
It is hard to know, at this point in time, how controversial such a
statement is. Law and economics scholars such as Henry Hansmann and
Mlichael Klausner have moved away from the descriptive form of the nexus
of contracts theory by suggesting that government does need to play a role in
creating the corporate "contract."8 Easterbrook and Fischel have touted a
hypothetical bargain to be used contemporaneously with the actual bargain of
the parties.88 And, of course, noncontractarians have long believed in the
importance of government regulation to the nature of the firm. 9 Ribstein's
approach is in many ways unremarkable. But it signals that, to the extent
there was a debate about the positive version of nexus of contracts theory,
the debate is over.
III. LARRY AS ECONOMIC LIBERATOR

Of course, it is Ribstein's normative commitment to contractarianism
that draws him to the uncorporation in the first place. The uncorporation
offers the contractual flexibility that the corporation lacks.
Indeed,
"uncorporation" itself is merely a label put on a variety of different
organizational forms that offer an assortment of organizational approaches.
The flexibility represented by these forms, both internally and as a group,
allows for greater specialization and even "idiosyncratic arrangements."9 0 For
example, when it comes to fiduciary duties, Ribstein notes that Delaware
corporate shareholders cannot waive the duties of loyalty and good faith,
whereas that state offers much more flexibility on that score for limited
partnerships and LLCs. 1 Some of this flexibility can be put to very specific
use. Ribstein advocates that business association owners have stronger access
to the firm's cash on hand, through distributions or the power to demand
87

Hansmann, supra note 45, at 10 (discussing the government's role in structuring long-term

s9

relational contracts); Klausner, supra note 10, at 793-96 (blaming learning and network
externalities for the dearth of contractual innovation at the corporate level).
Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 6, at 1444-46.
Bratton, supra note 5, at 442 ("Freedom of contract is freedom to ask the sovereign to
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confer power constraining your freedom on another party."); id. at 445 (noting that "the
sovereign presence persists" in corporate law); Eisenberg, supra note 8, at 823-25
(discussing mandatory rules).
RIBSTEIN, supra note 39, at 157.
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liquidation or buyout. 92 This access, in his view, would provide much greater
market discipline against the managerial agency costs that have plagued the
93
public corporation in the last decade.
However, Ribstein acknowledges that all is not completely contractual,
not even in the uncorporate world. Uncorporations have adopted the
94
partnership approach of restricting transferability of management rights.
Most LLC statutes do not provide for a default right to disassociate, in order
to accommodate tax law requirements about the liquidity of estate assets. 95
And although LLCs have more flexible governance requirements than
corporations, most statutes provide only a "binary choice between managerand member-management." 96 In addition, standardization may be appropriate
"to clarify the expectations of the many people with which the corporation
deals." 91 Despite his admiration for Delaware's freedom to waive such duties,
Ribstein acknowledges that "[a]s LLCs increasingly become the new default
entity, many undoubtedly are being formed with plain-vanilla certificates and
no detailed arrangements." 98 As a result, restrictions on waivers in other
states' LLC statutes may make sense as long as Delaware remains an option
for sophisticated LLCs. Ribstein argues: "This illustrates how distinctiveness
can be as important among different statutory versions of the same business
associations as it is among different types of business associations." 99
Rather than minimizing the role of government in the uncorporation,
Ribstein's analysis highlights it. Rise is rife with discussions of the
inefficiencies of legislative drafting, 100 the importance of tax policies such as
92

Id.at 139.
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Id.at 209-12.
Id at 182.
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Id.at 179-80. Ribstein argues that this has had "the perverse secondary effect of forcing
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lawmakers to provide a backup exit right" in the form of judicial dissolution. Id.
at 180.
However, Delaware does allow parties to contract out of this dissolution remedy. See id.
at 181; R & R Capital, LLC v. Buck & Doe Run Valley Farms, LLC, No. 3803-CC, 2008
WL 3846318, at *8(Del. Ch. Aug. 19, 2008).
RIBSTEIN, supra note 39, at 153.
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Id.at 149.
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Id.Ribstein also notes the confusion surrounding whether interests in LLCs are securities.
Id.
at 186-89; see also
Robinson v. Glynn, 349 F.3d 166, 174 (4th Cir. 2003) (holding that
the determination must be made case by case, since "LLCs lack standardized membership
rights or organizational structures" and thus "can assume an almost unlimited variety of
forms"). He notes that state lawmakers might consider offering clear management
alternatives, rather than a spectrum of flexible management possibilities, in order to create
more certainty when it comes to securities regulation. RIBSTEIN, supra note 39, at 189.
Id.
at 155-56.
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the Kirntner factors and "check the box," 10 1 and regulatory arbitrage. 10 2 One is
constantly reminded of the heavy hand of the state in creating corporations
and uncorporations, in all their permutations. This approach suits Ribstein's
normative agenda, which is to identify and eliminate market impurities
introduced by legislative meddling. 103 But in his criticism of government, he
must not only acknowledge that they sometimes get it right (LLCs, check-thebox), but also that the state holds the cards and controls the game. Entities
are state creations-a fact made abundantly clear.
At the end of the book, Ribstein cites the possibility of the un-business
association-the "fully customized firm." 104 Although he doesn't frame it
exactly this way, one gets the sense the un-business-association would be
Ribstein's ideal when it comes to organizational forms. Of course, at least
one non-contractual element would still be necessary. As Ribstein describes
it, an un-business association statute would allow parties to "enter into a
customized contract, but still have limited liability-a sort of 'contractual
entity."' 105 Is this organizational form our future? Or are we destined to
have no organizational forms at all-only contracts?
At this moment, the long-term future of corporations seems potentially
suspect. As Ribstein has well documented, the corporation is under siege by
this plethora of new organizational structures. When the Treasury moved to
"check-the-box" taxation for these new entities, they became viable
alternatives to the corporation in a variety of different fields. The flexibility of
the LLC form is in contrast to many of the requirements, state and federal,
placed upon the corporation. 106 It seems, perhaps, as if Jensen & Meckling's
"nexus of contracts" model is coming to life in the LLC, and the
corporation's failure to live up to their model is bringing it down.

101 Id. at 100, 131-32.
102 Id. at 184-86, 192.
103 E.g., id. at 185 ("[L]awmakers could minimize total social costs by designing tax and
regulatory statutes that take into consideration business association coherence as well as
other statutory objectives.").
104 Id. at 256.
105 Id.
106

Moreover, when it comes to the public corporation, commentators have suggested that
more firms are going private because of the regulatory requirements layered upon the
public corporation. William J. Carney, The Costs of Being Public after Sarbanes-Oxey: The Irony
of "Going Private'" 55 EMORY L. J. 141 (2006). Bartlett argues, however, that SarbanesOxley is not to blame for the high-profile "going private" transactions of the last decade.
Robert P. Bartlett iii, Going Private But Stajing Public"Reexamining the Effect of Sarbanes-Oxey
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The employment relation appears to be moving from firm to market as
well. In the mid-twentieth century, labor economists identified internal labor
markets as a deviation from neoclassical labor market theory. 107 These
economists found that employees largely stayed within one firm for their
lifetime of employment, and that firms generally used internal promotion to
fill vacancies. These findings established an empirical basis for Coase's
notion of the importance of the employment relation to the firm. Moreover,
internal labor markets are an instantiation of the separateness of the firm
from the market; they demonstrate that the firm is truly a different set of
relationships. However, economists are finding that the importance of
internal labor markets has been dwindling.
Beginning in the 1970s, firms began to hire more temporary and
contingent workers. 108 This trend accelerated through the 1990s, and
continues apace. Recent reports indicate that the 2008 recession has turned
many employees into "permanent" temporary workers, with as much as 26
percent of the workforce now having "nonstandard" jobs. 10 9 And the effects
go beyond low-skill and low-wage employment; executive officers, lawyers,
and scientists are all among the temporarily employed. 110 Moreover,
"outsourcing"-a word of relatively recent vintage - continues to break down
relationships that were traditionally within the firm.111 What Alan Hyde said
in 1998 continues to be true today: "Increasingly, labor is hired through
short-term, market-mediated arrangements that may not be 'employment'
112
relations in any legal or technical sense of that word."
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KATHERINE V.S. STONE, FROM WIDGETS TO DIGITS: EMPLOYMENT REGULATION FOR

THE CHANGING WORKPLACE 52-56 (2004).
108 Id. at 68-70.
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7,
2010),
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110 Id. See also STEVEN GREENHOUSE, THE BIG SQUEEZE 118 (2008) (discussing high-level
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University Law School, Law & Economics Series, Working Paper No. 09-19), available
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During this new millennium, commentators have further analyzed the
dissolution of the traditional employment relationship.113 The breakdown in
internal labor markets has occurred mainly with respect to workers on either
end of the skill spectrum. Low-skilled workers find themselves in at-will
employment contracts, which leave them exposed to outsourcing or
replacement by other temporary workers. 114 Highly skilled workers are also
less likely to be captured by internal labor markets as they are able to leverage
their skills in the marketplace to move from project to project, employer to
employer.11
Internal labor markets have continued to dissolve as mediumskilled workers acquire fewer firm-specific firms, move between firms more
frequently, and do so with more portable benefits at their disposal (especially
defined contribution plans like 401k's).116 As Kathy Stone has argued, "Work
has become contingent, not merely in the sense that it is formally defined as
short-term or episodic, but in the sense that the attachment between the firm
11
and the worker has been weakened."
If the corporation is giving way to a more contractually-oriented form of
business enterprise, and the employment relationship is dissolving back into
the market, then perhaps corporations (or their successor organizational
forms) will exist only to structure financial relationships and confer limited
liability. What would corporate law look like? What would employment law
look like? The possibility of a radically individualized future is not necessarily
a nightmare for progressive thinkers.
As low- and highly-skilled workers move out of internal labor markets
into external ones, one could imagine a variety of ways that they may come
together for mutual benefit. In some cases, this may take place on a relatively
small scale. For example, there is already some indication of a move to
smaller, more localized production in agriculture, as well as specialty foods
like craft beer, smoked meats, and artisanal cheese.118 These small-bore firms
promote greater attention to detail and provide broader consumer choice.
113

See STONE, supra note 107, at 67-86; Samuel Estreicher, Employer Reputation at Work, 27
HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 1 (2009).

114 See Estreicher, Employer Reputation at Work, supra note 113, at 4.
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116 See id. at 5; Samuel Issacharoff & Erica Worth Harris, Is Age D'scmnaion Realy Age
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They may also encourage greater freedom of movement within one's career.
Smaller agglomerations of individual workers who move from project to
project, rather than from firm to firm, may allow greater independence, and
may provide workers with greater bargaining power. The death of the
massive public corporation may engender a Jeffersonian-style renaissance of
small producers and greater attention to quality.
Of course, greater worker participation in the management of business
firms wouldn't necessarily have to be limited to small-scale ventures.
Workers may, on a broad scale, enter into contracts that involve much more
than the simple exchange of labor for wages. In employee cooperatives, for
example, workers also have economic and managerial interests in the
enterprise. Each worker-member in such a cooperative has input into the dayto-day and long term decisionmaking of the firm on a one worker, one vote
basis.119 For larger cooperatives, this power is exercised in the ability to elect
members of a governing board. 120 Worker-members share in both the
decisionmaking and profits.
Employee cooperatives of this sort have already been successfully
established on large scales in agricultural settings. The plywood cooperatives
in the Pacific Northwest are a well-studied example. 121 More recently, the
Tata Group in India established a cooperative as part of a strategy of
divesting itself of a subsidiary, the Tetley Tea Company, which it had acquired
for $450 million in 2000.122 Instead of selling its agricultural plots to rich
landowners or other corporations, Tara sold a majority of them to former
employees of the company and established a cooperative that was eventually
known as the Kenan Devan Hills Plantation Company (KDHP). 123 The
cooperative has placed great emphasis on outreach activities that involve
124
health and education programs for their workers and their communities.
119
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KDHP now employs over 12,000 workers, most of whom are also
1 25
shareholders, and has become the largest tea company in South India.
Although employee cooperatives have traditionally been concentrated in
agricultural or other rural industries, the rise of the internet may facilitate
expansion of this particular business form. 126 As an initial matter, workers
interested in such a venture may find information and guidance on this type
of organizational structure more readily on the internet than otherwise
possible. But, more directly, the internet may allow like-minded workers
separated by great distances to come together into a cooperative without the
imposition of the type of physical facilities and middle-management
superstructure usually associated with such ventures. And, more generally,
the flexibility fostered by internet may facilitate all sorts of productive
combinations of workers.
Thus, workers, freed from traditional contractual norms associated with
internal labor markets, may thus come together in different ways, large and
small. Employee cooperatives give workers a role in decisionmaking and a
share of the profits. Other institutional structures offer variations on those
themes. German-style codetermination, for example, gives workers some
decisionmaking authority through its works councils, but no real access to the
profits. 121 Employee stock ownership plans do the opposite-workers are
entitled to a share of the firm's profits but have no real access to the
decisionmaking process. 1 28 And though Ribstein didn't spend as much time
contemplating the role of the worker in most of his work on uncorporations,
access to these types of organizational structures are clearly within the
individual orderings contemplated by his broad commitment to
contractarianism.
Although internal labor markets aren't expected to disappear anytime
soon, they, too, may move in the direction of greater contractual diversity.
There is already evidence that workers are engaging with external markets on
a number of fronts. Greater labor mobility, fewer firm-specific skills, and
portable benefits have already been mentioned. But there are a number of
125
126
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other ways in which the traditional parties to a corporation might move
toward greater worker independence. While unions may continue to engage
in their core functions of negotiating and monitoring compliance with
collective bargaining agreements, workers may also contract with other unionlike institutions that maintain varying degrees of independence from
employers.129 Some of those institutions may move closer to employers, and
engage both managers and workers in a consultative role. 130 Others may
function more in the capacity of service providers, completely disengaged
from employers, and furnish workers with such things as legal advice or
opportunities for professional development.131 For example, the Freelancers'
Union provides affordable health insurance and access to a health clinic with
yoga classes and other services. 13 2 As the Union's founder has argued, "If
Gompers were alive today, he'd be trying to figure out what the next models
'
are for today's workers."133
Labor, just like capital in Ribstein's vision of
uncorporations, may begin to organize itself in a greater variety of contractual
arrangements.
While some of these changes may be under the control of the parties,
others may demand removal of some of the legal obstacles to free
contracting. Traditional unions could be freed up to bargain on such things
that are currently either illegal-such as hot cargo clauses 13 4-or strongly
discouraged-such as employee representation on corporate boards.135 We
could eliminate state "right to work" laws, which prohibit unions and
employers from freely bargaining for union security arrangements. 136 The
129
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see 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(A) (2006), and strikes to enforce them, see 29 U.S.C. 5
158(b)(4)(C) (2006); Local 1976 v. NLRB (Sand Door Case), 357 U.S. 93, 98, 104, 106-07
(1958).
135 See Estreicher, supra note 131, at 844.
136 See 29 U.S.C. § 164(b) (2006) (allowing states to prohibit union security devices). Twentythree states have exercised this power. See Kenneth Glenn Dau-Schmidt & Winston Lin,
The Great Recession, the Resling Bdget Shorfalls, the 2010 Elections and the Attack on Public
Sector Collective Bargaining in the United States, 29 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 407, 428-31
(2012).

Viinia Law & Business Review

8:121 (2014)

creation of some of the quasi-union organizations may also require some legal
changes, such as lifting the ban on prehire agreements13 or relaxing the rules
on employer support of such employee organizations. 138 These, and other
changes set out in what Samuel Estreicher terms a "freedom of contract"
agenda, 139 may increase the number of possible arrangements open to
workers.
There may also be ways to enhance the contractual possibilities of those
workers who remain in internal labor markets. Although such workers, by
definition, move between firms relatively infrequently, those moves still occur
(and are, perhaps, more significant given their rarity). These workers also
move within firms as they are promoted, demoted, or transferred. At all of
these junctures, workers are faced with new contractual opportunities,
however limited, and would benefit from more information. One can
imagine that organizations could arise to provide that information about
things such as a potential new firm's behavior in the past with respect to its
workers; a current or new firm's market position; and wage and benefit data
for comparable positions in the industry.
Armed with this kind of
information, workers may be able to alter certain aspects of their new
employment contracts or, even in take-it-or-leave-it situations, make better
informed decisions.
Enhancing the contractual opportunities available to workers does have
some distinct advantages. Workers with better information may be able to
tailor contracts to better fit their personal situations. This may not only lead
to better contracts, but the sense of control over one's worklife which would
itself contribute to a worker's sense of well-being. And such positive
engagement with the employer would be beneficial to all corporate
constituents.
There may be other advantages of moving toward a more contractarian
regime for workers. With more freedom to contract, one would expect
workers to enter into an increasingly diverse set of agreements that detail their
relationships with other constituents. This, in turn, may begin to break down
the traditional distinctions between owners, managers, and workers. This is
certainly true, by definition, when it comes to the various forms of employee137
138
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owned or -managed enterprises discussed above. But a blurring of roles may
also take place in more traditional corporations as workers, alone or in
groups, begin to structure contracts that involve more of what are usually
considered ownership or management rights.
Allowing workers to restructure their relationships with each other and
with other corporate constituents is certainly consistent with Ribstein's
contractarian impulses and his development of the uncorporation. Workers,
like other corporate constituents, should be able to move beyond their
traditional roles and create contractual relationships that more fully satisfy
their individual preferences. This could be accomplished by altering some of
the existing legal structures governing their relationships with other firm
constituents, much as uncorporations undo many of the legal strictures of
corporations.
Changing the legal restrictions and defaults with respect to employees is
one thing. But one wouldn't have to go this far. Some good could come by
merely having workers (and other firm participants) act in new capacities.
Getting past the old categories would allow better expression of a full range
of people's preferences. Under existing norms, corporate constituents tend
to act on preferences consistent with their roles in the corporation. At a very
general level, people acting in market contexts tend to focus on bottom-line
considerations to the exclusion of other preferences. 140 And, more
specifically, shareholders attempt to maximize profit; consumers attend to
focus on price and product quality. 141 Non-market values-things like the
social values of the corporation, its treatment of workers, environmental
impacts-fall by the wayside. Markets then, are hegemonic-people act for
142
personal gain and other values are reflected in what they do with that gain.
This is curious, however, because we know from a wide range of research
that people possess and act upon other-regarding preferences in non-market
contexts. 143 So what accounts for the apparent on-again, off-again nature of
people's preferences? As we've argued elsewhere, one possibility is that
people do not consult their entire set of preferences when making decisions;
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instead, they rely upon a proper subset of their interests. 144 Different
contexts (e.g., market versus non-market) and different roles may focus
attention of different sets of preferences. "Just as looking at a glass of cold
water may focus one's attention on his thirst, staring at a prospectus may
make one focus on a corporation's profitability." 145 Other preferences, even
strongly held ones, may stay "offline" in such situations.
Thus, enhancing the contractual freedom of workers and other
constituents may ultimately allow them to act in ways that maximize the full
range of their preferences. Workers could begin to think more like owners,
and vice versa. And such a state of affairs would complete the dream of any
contractarian: to ensure that markets reflected people's preferences rather
than the other way around.
At least, we should not reject this possibility. Larry Ribstein's world is
one of greater economic freedom. Liberals have come to regard economic
freedom reflexively as promoting a winner-take-all state in which the vast
majority of workers are oppressed by capital. But it would not necessarily
turn out that way. The communist state is less "progressive" than an
unrestrained capitalist state would be, and economic freedom can promote
personal freedom.
Progressives should take Ribstein's challenge of
promoting greater economic flexibility as a way of promoting human
flourishing. To the extent some people would flail and fail under such a
system, progressives should envision social structures that would provide
support. But these structures need not be a massive regulatory state. Smallbore structures-micro-lending, employee ownership, unions or trade groups
that offer insurance and support-can help individuals achieve success
without the bureaucratic structures of a massive welfare state. It may turn out
that Ribstein's world would look more like a 19 h-Century English industrial
town than it would the buzzing, whizzing world of dynamic contractual
invention. But progressive should not assume such a scenario-not when
there are possibilities to explore.
The tide may be turning back to a more employee-oriented workplace.
Popular management literature emphasizes the importance of the
employee. 146 Small startups, particularly in the tech industry, are once again

144
145
146

See Hayden & Bodie, supra note 142, at 498; Stephen Ellis & Grant Hayden, Law and
EconomicsAfter BehavioralEconomics, 55 KAN. L. REV. 629, 661-67 (2007).
See Hayden & Bodie, supra note 142, at 498.
See, e.g., TONY HSIEH, DELIVERING HAPPINESS: A PATH TO PROFITS, PASSION, AND
PURPOSE (2010) (discussing Zappos' approach to employee service).

8:121 (2014)

Larny from the Left

blurring the line between entrepreneur and employee. 14v Academia is
evolving, as well. Recent research into the theory of the firm has focused on
the importance of knowledge-based assets and the distribution of access top
those assets within the firm. 1 4 As we learn more about the importance of
trust, norms, and procedural justice within the corporation, employees will
1 49
grow even more in importance.
It is possible to envision a radically individualized future, in which each
worker is a "corporation" unto herself and firms are merely temporary
agglomerations within the global market. It is also possible to envision a
future in which employees participate at the highest levels of governance, and
corporations are tools of team production rather than investor enrichment.
Perhaps both of these futures are in store, to varying degrees within different
industries.
Ribstein has encouraged us to envision a decentralized,
contractual future. Progressives should take him up on it.
IV. CONCLUSION: LIVING IN LARRY'S FUTURE

Larry Ribstein envisions a world that is not for the faint-hearted or
ignorant. It requires workers to look for the best use of their talents, and to
enter economic relationships that match best with their preferences and
opportunities. It is a world shorn of bureaucracy, but also shorn of standard
forms. It eschews bailouts and cronyism. 150 It also asks us to keep on our
toes, lest we fall behind or be taken advantage of.
Progressives will want to look to the losers under such a system, and ask
about their fate. The safety net should be strong.51 But at the same time,
progressives do not want to find themselves defending the "crony" capitalists,
the bureaucrats, the defenders of the status quo. A world of contractual
141
148
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freedom offers tremendous opportunity for individuals to pursue their talents
without the encrustation of societal red tape or past practices to encumber
them.
A lot is riding, though, on how those contracts are constructed. It is not
surprising, then, that Ribstein's world has a significant and creative role for
attorneys. In his article on legal education reform, Ribstein describes lawyers
as collaborators, manufacturers, lawmakers, information engineers, and
capitalists. 15 2 Constructing legal relationships in a variety of settings allows
attorneys to be much more influential in unlocking value within the economy.
In fact, the level of legal knowledge amongst all economic participants would
need a significant boost for participants to take full advantage of their
economic freedom. Lawyers and law schools could play an important role in
this new economy-a role that legal education has really yet to explore.
This essay has taken an optimistic, perhaps even Panglossian, perspective
on the world of contractual freedom envisioned by Larry Ribstein. But we
think it is appropriate to do so, if only to get us started. Sticking with the
tried-and-true always seems safer. It was Larry's hope that he could push us
off of that secure station, into an unknown but potentially limitless future.
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